Differential Privacy under Dependent Tuples - The Case of Genomic Privacy.
The rapid progress in genome sequencing has led to high availability of genomic data. However, due to growing privacy concerns about the participant's sensitive information, accessing results and data of genomic studies is restricted to only trusted individuals. On the other hand, paving the way to biomedical discoveries requires granting open access to genomic databases. Privacy-preserving mechanisms can be a solution for granting wider access to such data while protecting their owners. In particular, there has been growing interest in applying the concept of differential privacy (DP) while sharing summary statistics about genomic data. DP provides a mathematically rigorous approach but it does not consider the dependence between tuples in a database, which may degrade the privacy guarantees offered by the DP. In this work, focusing on genomic databases, we show this drawback of DP and we propose techniques to mitigate it. First, using a real-world genomic dataset, we demonstrate the feasibility of an inference attack on differentially private query results by utilizing the correlations between the tuples in the dataset. The results show that the adversary can infer sensitive genomic data about a user from the differentially private query results by exploiting correlations between genomes of family members. Second, we propose a mechanism for privacy-preserving sharing of statistics from genomic datasets to attain privacy guarantees while taking into consideration the dependence between tuples. By evaluating our mechanism on different genomic datasets, we empirically demonstrate that our proposed mechanism can achieve up to 50% better privacy than traditional DP-based solutions. https://github.com/nourmadhoun/Differential-privacy-genomic-inference-attack. Supplementary data are available at Bioinformatics online.